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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
All forms of consumption taxes have the same basic, desirable effecton
the economythey eliminate the distortion present in an income tax
between current and future consumption. But different ways of adminis-
tering consumption taxes have different effects in the long run and
especially during the transition. Sales taxes and value-added taxesre-
quire a one-time increase in the price level, a shock that the Hall-
Rabushka and personal consumption taxes avoid. The basis value-added
tax (VAT) requires a one-time appreciation of the dollar, a shock that
other consumption taxes avoid. Generally, consumption taxes would
impose a new tax on the rental value of owner-occupied housing, which
might have a small adverse net effect on housing. This effect could be
offset by a personal housing deduction. The present paper also discusses
effects on interest rates, bonds, equities, human capital, and retirement
saving.
This paper was prepared for the 1995 National Bureau of Economic Research Conference
on Tax Policy and the Economy, Washington, D.C., November 7. I am grateful to E. Cary
Brown for early counseling in these matters, to David Bradford for helpful discussions over
the past two decades, and to James Poterba and Dale Jorgenson for comments on the
earlier draft. All remaining errors are mine.72Hall
1. INTRODUCTION
Tax reform is concentrating more and more on consumption taxes.The
wedge of the income tax raises the price of later consumption relative to
the price of current consumption. A basic goal of consumption taxation
is to remove that wedge. The rationale is deep and generalin anin-
tertemporal economy, capital is an intermediate product, and it is unde-
sirable to tax intermediate products at all.
A tax reform that replaces an income tax with a consumption taxhas a
key intertemporal effect. Under an income tax at rate r, the relative price
of consumption this year is distorted by the factor (1 - i-)relative to
consumption i years from now. The cheapening of current consumption
relative to future consumption caused by an income tax is the sourceof
its disincentive for saving. Under a consumption tax, there is nodistor-
tion at all between present and future consumption. The incentive to
save is at its efficient level.
There are many ways to set up a consumption tax, but all of themhave
the same fundamental effect on the economy. The only distortion pres-
ent under a consumption tax is between the household'sinternal use of
time and time spent in the market. At the most basic level,different
forms of consumption taxes cannot be judged by their effects onrelative
prices. Still, it is important to understand the various ways thatvalue-
added taxes, sales taxes, and personal consumption taxes differ.Relative
prices differ among these consumption taxes because under some tax
systems, prices and wages are quoted before taxes andunder others,
after taxes. The immediate effects of tax reform can differbecause of
wage rigidity and because there are one-timewealth effects associated
with the before- and after-tax distinction.
To give some organization to the discussion, I will proceed inthe
following way. I start by describing the various consumption tax systems
that are under consideration. These are three variants of thevalue-
added tax, the sales tax, and the personal consumption tax.Then I lay
out the basic effects of the taxes on atemporal relative pricesin an open
economy and draw certain conclusionsabout the transition. Next, I
consider the implications of nominal wage rigidity in order to describe
the effects of tax reform on nominal prices and the valueof nominal
debt. I move on to the more difficult territory of intertemporaleffects,
particularly interest rates. I then consider the effects of tax reform on
housing and human capital. Finally, I examine the key transition issueof
the possible double taxation of assets accumulated under an income tax
used to finance consumption under a consumption tax.Effects of Tax Reform on Prices and Asset Values73
2. TAXES CONSIDERED
A value-added tax (VAT) is a tax on firms on the difference between total
revenue and purchases of intermediate products from other firms. Pur-
chases of capital goods are counted as intermediate products. I will
assume that firms quote their prices inclusive of the VAT. With respect
to foreign trade, the VAT may be on an origin or destination basis. The
origin-basis VAT includes revenue from foreign sales in the base and
permits deductions for purchases of intermediate products from foreign
sources. The destination-basis VAT excludes exports and imports, or,
equivalently, imposes an import duty at the VAT rate and pays a rebate
on exports. Finally, the HallRabushka VAT (Hall and Rabushka, 1995) is
a variant of the origin-basis VAT in which the firm deducts the wages
that it pays, and there is a personal wage tax at the VAT rate. The
motivation for this complication is that it permits easy administration of
an exemption in order to make the VAT progressive. The Hall-
Rabushka proposal is usually called the flat tax, although it really has
two brackets, one at zero and the other at a single positive rate. Many
popular discussions of the flat tax do not refer to the Hall-Rabushka
proposal and may not even refer to consumption taxes.
A consumption sales tax is a tax imposed on sellers of consumption
goods at the point where they go into the hands of final consumers.
Again, I assume that firms quote prices inclusive of tax. I will also as-
sume that the tax is on the destination basisit is imposed on imported
consumption goods, and all exported goods are free from tax.
A personal consumption tax measures consumption at the household
level on a cash-flow basis. It is a personal income tax with an unlimited
deduction for saving. The NunnDomenici U.S. tax includes a personal
consumption tax as well as an 11 percent VAT.
With respect to houses, I will assume that the VATs and the sales tax
are imposed on the sellers of new houses and that the purchase of a new
house is treated as consumption under a personal consumption tax. The
latter assumption is probably not realistic, but it does not seem worth-
while to track down the complexities in the way that housing would
actually be handled under a personal consumption tax.
All the taxes thus far described are consumption taxes. The tax base
for the destination VAT, the consumption sales tax, and the personal
consumption tax is literally consumption as measured in the national
income accounts, except that housing is treated as a consumer durable.
The tax base for the origin VAT differs by the amount of the trade
surplus. But, since the present discounted value of the trade surplus74Hall
must be the net indebtedness of the United States to the rest of the
world, which was determined by history, the origin VAT differs from a
consumption tax only by a lump sum.
3. BASIC ATEMPORAL EFFECTS
To explain the basic effects, I will make the simplifying assumption that
there is only one kind of output. Absent taxes, all types of output would
have the same price. As numeraire, I will take the consumption good
after the VAT or sales tax but before the personal tax. I assume competi-
tion in all markets. I denote the marginal product of labor by A. The
prices I consider are the following:
the wage paid by the firm;
the wage received by the worker;
the price of traded goods paid by the export customer or received by
the import supplier;
the price of investment goods received by the seller;
the value of investment goods to the owner, net of tax; and
the value of housing to the owner, net of tax.
Table 1 shows the effects on these relative prices of the various taxes.
4. TRANSITION ISSUES INFERRED FROM EFFECTS
ON RELATIVE PRICES
As I noted in Section 1, the immediate effects of a move to a consump-
tion tax involve not only the relative price effects displayed in Table 1,
but also issues of wage rigidity and changes in interest rates. Still, some
important inferences follow from Table 1.
First, under either the destination or origin VATs or under the sales
tax, the real product wage must fall by the amount of the tax. Under
the existing income tax, wages are set on a pretax basis, whereas under
the VATs or sales tax, wages are set on an after-tax basis. Most of the
issues associated with the lowering of the real product wage have to do
with wage rigidity, so I will defer further discussion of this point until
Section 5.
Second, under the destination-basis VAT or under the sales tax, the
price of traded goods falls below the price of consumption goods by the
amount of the tax. These taxes are hugely attractive to politicians be-
cause the export subsidy and import tax are thought to improve some-TABLE 1
Prices Relative to Domestic Consumption Goods
For the two VATs and the sales tax, the goodswork wedge occurs within the firm. The equilibrium wage at zero
profit is equal to the net after-tax selling price ( - t) multiplied by the marginal product of labor A.
For the three taxes where the wage component is collected at the personal level, there is no tax wedge at the firm
level.
For the two VATs and the sales tax, the wage paid and the wage received are the same.
Hence, all six taxes drive the same wedge between the benefit of working and the price of consumption goods.
The wedge is the inescapable inefficiency of taxation when it is impossible to tax the consumption of time at home.
For the three taxes where the wage component is collected at the personal level, there is no tax wedge at that level.
I The destination VAT and the sales tax raise the price of consumption goods above traded goods because the tax is
levied on imports and rebated on exports.
r Consumption goods and traded goods have the same price for taxes without border adjustments.
For the VATs, including HallRabushka, purchasers pay the same price for investment goods as for consumption
goods; they receive the tax incentive for investment through a deduction against their own taxes. The personal
consumption tax provides the incentive on the saving rather than the investment side, so it has equal prices for
consumption and investment. Finally, the personal income tax does not have an incentive, so it, too, keeps the
prices the same.
Under the consumption sales tax, the market price of investment goods is below the price of consumption goods
so as to provide the incentive for investment.
I Under the three VATs and the personal consumption tax, the sale of investment goods incurs a tax.
Under the sales tax, the price of investment goods is already less than the price of consumption goods; thus, all
consumption taxes drive the value of investment goods to t.
Under the income tax, with depreciation allowances that track market value, existing investment goods sell at par
with new ones.
Given the assumption that the sale of an existing house has no tax consequences for any of the six taxes, the prices
of new and existing houses will be on par. I have assumed that all the consumption taxes treat new houses as
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thing called competitiveness. This idea receives no support from econom-
ics. Real exchange rates will change to offset the tax change. Whether
this occurs as a change in the nominal rate as well depends on the
behavior of the price level, a topic deferred to Section 5.
Third, all the consumption taxes depress the price of existing capital
goods. Whereas, under an income tax, the owner of capital goods can
convert them to consumption without paying additional taxes, the same
conversion incurs the consumption tax in all cases. Under the VATs, the
tax is paid directly by the business if sales of existing capital are counted
as negative investment. If not, the same effect occursbecause used capi-
tal will not qualify for the tax deduction given to newly produced capital.
Under the sales tax, both the prices of new and existing capital are
depressed by the amount of the tax, and under a personal consumption
tax, the sale of capital goods is taxed as negative saving. The depression
of the price of existing capital is a more precise statement of a point made
frequently in different language: the move from income to consumption
taxation imposes double taxes on existing saving. It was taxed first un-
der the income tax and now will be taxed again under the consumption
tax. The statement is clearly true for direct ownership of capital goods.
Its truth for savings in nominal financial claims depends on the price
level issues to be considered in Section 5.
Finally, Table 1 reveals no transition issues for housing. Both the
income tax and the consumption tax in all its variants leave the price of
houses on par with goods consumption. This conclusion is overreaching
for two reasons: (1) it considers housing to be a completely produced
good and does not consider the price of land, and (2) it looks at housing
only from the supply side; in the short run, the demand for housing will
affect the prices of existing houses. I take up the housing demand issues
in Section 7.
Stock Prices
As a simplification, think of equity as direct ownership of capital goods.
The consumption tax depresses the purchasing power of the existing
capital stock. Domestic equity holders suffer capital losses from con-
sumption tax reform. The destination VAT and the sales tax keep foreign
equity holders whole because these taxes lower the price of traded goods
in terms of domestic consumption goods by the same amount.' The
1This point may be easier to see if one supposes that the price of domestic consumption
goods rises by the amount of the tax. Neither the price of equity nor the price of traded
goods changes at all. Domestic shareholders suffer a loss of purchasing power, but foreign
equity holders can still buy the same volume of goods with their shares as they could
before tax reform.Effects of Tax Reform on Prices and Asset Values77
origin VAT and HallRabushka impose the same loss on foreign equity
holders as on domestic ones.
5. NOMINAL PRICES AND PRICE MEASUREMENT
Prediction of the effects on nominal prices as the result of the transition
to a consumption tax enters the tricky territory of price-level economics.
Under monetary neutrality, the price level is chosen unilaterally by the
central bank. An event such as tax reform affects the price level only to
the extent that it makes the central bank choose a different target.
With monetary nonneutrality, there is more to say, although of course
the central bank unambiguously chooses the price level in the longer
run. The biggest issue is how nominal prices and wages achieve the
decline in the real product wage required under a VAT or sales tax.
Either the price level must rise or the wage level must fall. If the latter is
ruled out as impractical, then the economy needs a quick burst of infla-
tion. If the inflation triggers indexation, there may be further problems.
British adoption of the VAT in 1979 put the economy through this type
of cycle.
The central problem is the wage contract. Under the income tax,
wages are set on a pretax basis. Workers pay taxes from their earnings.
The taxes that put wages on an after-tax basisthe VATs and the sales
taxcall for either a price change or a wage change to accommodate
the switch. One way is for wages to fall by the amount of the tax.
Except for effects caused by changes in tax rates, there would then be
no change in after-tax wages, and prices would not have to change.
Evidence on the nature of the wage contract suggests that it would be
difficult to bring about the immediate wage cut. The other way to
accommodate the change is for prices to rise. Then the wage contract is
honored in nominal terms, but real after-tax earnings are kept stable in
the face of tax reform by the price increase. For a price increase to
work, it is essential that there be no feedback from prices to wages. In
an economy with full cost-of-living escalation of wages, no price in-
crease would be large enough to get the real after-tax wage back down
to its appropriate level.
The best answer would appear to be to encourage firms to reset prices
on the day that the tax becomes effective by the amount of the tax and
then to define the cost-of-living index to exclude the VAT or sales tax.
The goal is to get the price level to rise immediately but not to develop
any momentum, and to prevent wages from changing at all.
The taxes that leave wages on a pretax basisHallRabushka and the
personal consumption taxdo not encounter this problem at all. The78Hall
existing wage and price levels remain the appropriate levels after tax
reform.
The assumption in the remainder of the present paper is that the
standard VATs (but not HallRabushka) and the sales tax cause a one-
time increase in the prices of consumption goods, and the other taxes
leave the price level unchanged. This assumption is stated in the first
line of Table 2.
5.1 Nominal Exchange Rates
As noted in Section 4, the destination VAT and the sales tax drive
wedges between domestic consumption goods prices and the prices of
traded goods. As a result, they affect real exchange rates in the same
way. If, as previously suggested, the right accommodation to a VAT or
sales tax is an immediate jump in the nominal price level, then nominal
exchange rates need not change. However, it will not be possible to
introduce a VAT as a complete surprise and raise the price level by 20
percent in the same millisecond. The foreign exchange market will be
perturbed by expectations.
These conclusions are summarized in the second and third lines of
Table 2.
5.2 Value of Debt Claims
With respect to debt, the issue is the change in the price level. It is both
realistic and desirable for the domestic price of consumption goods to
rise by the amount of a VAT or sales tax. Thus, debt holders suffer a loss
of purchasing power over domestic consumption goods equal to the
amount of the tax, for these taxes. Foreign debt holders come out even in
relation to traded goods for the destination-basis VAT and the sales tax
and lose under the origin-basis VAT. No changes in any of these nomi-
nal variables or in the purchasing power of debt would need to occur
under HallRabushka or a personal consumption tax.
The conclusions about the purchasing power of debt are summarized
in the fourth and fifth lines of Table 2. They shed some more light on the
issue of the double taxation of existing saving as a result of a move from
income to consumption taxation. Under the standard VATs and the
sales tax, where a one-time rise in the price level is needed to accommo-
date the tax, the loss in purchasing power of nominal debt creates dou-
ble taxation. Under the personal consumption tax, there is no change in
the purchasing power of debt, but the act of consuming will be taxed, so
again there is double taxation. Only under HallRabushka, of the five



































































































































































































































































































































































































6. INTEREST RATES AND RELATED ISSUES
The most complicated and interesting issues about the move to consump-
tion taxation involve interest rates and asset markets. The discussion of
these issues is necessarily tentative because there are large unresolved
questions in the economics of consumption that bear directly on the
issues.
6.1 Fundamental Analysis
Although the fundamental analysis, based on the life-cycle theory of
consumption, does not seem to answer many of the questions about the
operation of world capital markets, it provides a good point of depar-
ture. In an economy where people live for many decades, or where
families have common budget constraints from one generation to the
next, the growth of consumption is governed by the Euler equation,
= cr[(1 - 'r)r - p1, (1)
where c is consumption; o- is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption; T is the income tax rate on interest; and p is the rate of
impatience. See Hall (1988) for a discussion of the rationalization of
equation (1).
Under the further assumption that in the steady state, the growth of





A consumption tax changes the income tax rate T to zero. If the rate were
previously, say, 30 percent, the interest rate should decline by 43 per-
cent on a switch to consumption taxation. Many important conclusions
about the transition would follow if this drop occurred quickly.
The discussion of the reasons that interest rates do not drop sharply
and immediately can be divided into three parts:
the decline cannot take effect until there has been enough extra invest-
ment to drive down the marginal product of capital;
large amounts of interest income are not currently taxed; and
the United States is embedded in a world capital market.Effects of Tax Reform on Prices and Asset Values81
6.2 Timing of Interest Decline in a Theoretical Model of a Closed
Economy
The effect of tax reform is well understood in a closed competitive econ-
omy with a single type of output, a single type of capital, and life-cycle
consumers (Hall, 1971). Assume for simplicity that the imposition of the
consumption tax is a surprise, so that there is no intertemporal substitu-
tion effect from the consumption tax. The market interest rate in the
economy is the net marginal product of capital. Assume, for the mo-
ment, that labor supply is inelastic. Because the tax reform does not
affect the capital stock and because there is no change in the level of
employment, the interest rate does not change initially. However, the
consumption Euler equation shifts because the income tax rate r has
fallen to zero. Consumption must grow faster; that is, consumers must
defer consumption to take advantage of the higher incentive to save.
Consequently, consumption falls discontinuously at the time of tax re-
form. The extra output is invested. As the capital stock rises, the interest
rate falls. As the interest rate approaches its new lower level, consump-
tion growth declines to equal the rate of growth of output.
At reasonable parameter values, the convergence to the new steady
state with more capital and a lower interest rate is largely completed
within a decade. If labor supply is elastic and is governed by life-cycle
principles, then the convergence is faster. The immediate effect of tax
reform is to stimulate labor supply, which elevates the interest rate in the
short run. The immediate depression of consumption is greater and the
rate of capital accumulation more rapid.
6.3 The Extent of Income Taxation of Interest Income
The model just discussed is a great oversimplification of the U.S. tax
system. Large amounts of business income are paid out as interest but
not taxed under the personal income tax (Gordon and Slemrod, 1988). In
fact, only a tiny fraction of all interest paid is reported as income under
the personal tax. The tax treatment of saving for retirement operates on
the consumption principle, in particular.
6.4 Interaction of the U.S. Economy and the Rest of the World
The U.S. capital markets are tightly integrated with those of other major
industrial countries, notably Japan, Britain, and Germany. Those coun-
tries rely on a mixture of consumption and income taxation and presum-
ably would not change their tax systems on U.S. tax reform. The analysis
of tax reform in the open U.S. economy has to consider the general
equilibrium in a world economy with heterogeneous tax systems.82Hall
The general equilibrium analysis encounters a basic problem, as a
number of earlier authors have observed. Equation (2), describing the
interest rate in the long run, ought to apply to each country, with pa-
rameters specific to the country. But a world capital market should have
a single real interest rate. The biggest paradox is for growth rates. High-
growth countries like Japan should have chronically higher interest
rates, according to the life-cycle theory. In fact, real interest rates seem to
be roughly equal among the major countries with open capital markets.
Although expected changes in real exchange rates can support differ-
ences in real interest rates in the short run, neither theory nor actual
experience suggests that this mechanism works in the long run.
Tax reform in the United States would encounter the same paradox.
How can the U.S. interest rate fall if interest rates in Japan and elsewhere
remain locked in place by equation (2)? The answer to both the growth
and tax paradoxes appears to be that real interest rates for equivalent
traded securities are equalized in world markets, but households see
rewards for saving that are sufficiently different to satisfy equation (2)
separately for each country's parameters.
Differences in internal capital markets among countries may be an
important part of the resolution of the paradox. For example, direct
controls on borrowing may prevent Japanese households from having
the high levels of debt that would be needed to satisfy the life-cycle
model's prescription for scheduling consumption in a high-growth, low-
interest economy. On the other hand, the U.S. consumer is in fairly
direct contact with world capital markets. Interest rates in the most
important credit market for households, the mortgage market, are
tightly linked to world rates.
In world equilibrium, firms and intermediaries in countries with natu-
rally high interest rates (with high growth rates and high income tax
rates) will be net suppliers of bonds in world markets. Equilibrium oc-
curs where the marginal cost of issuing more bonds is equated, after risk
adjustment, to the costs of other sources of funds and to the marginal
benefit from investing the funds. Patterns of specialization in the issu-
ance of securities should track differences in fundamental interest rates,
as described by equation (2).
In the resulting equilibrium, there may be scope for a considerable
effect of tax reform on U.S. interest rates. First, the United States is about
one third of the total world capital market. Second, relatively modest
changes in the pattern of specialization in world securities markets may
be enough to reach the new equilibrium in which the world interest rates
have moved most of the way to the point predicted by equation (2) for
the United States.7. HOUSING
The fear that consumption taxation would wipe out housing values is
one of the major political obstacles to tax reform. The factors entering the
analysis of this sensitive issue are the following:
A consumption tax stimulates demand for investment goods, such as
houses.
All the consumption taxes considered here place a new tax on the
rental value of the structural part of owner-occupied housing, which
will reduce the demand for housing.
The price of land in the long run and structures in the short run will
fall as a result of the elimination of the personal tax deduction for
mortgage interest.
The price of land will rise as the interest rate falls.
7.1 Houses as Investment Goods
It will be useful to imagine that houses are treated as investment goods
under a new consumption tax. That is, the effective price of a new house
is lower than the effective price of consumption by the amount of the
consumption tax. For example, under a sales tax, new houses would be
exempt from tax. By itself, this element of the consumption tax would
stimulate housing demand, just as a consumption tax will stimulate
demand for plants and equipment.
7.2 Taxation of the Rental Value of Owner-Occupied Structures
All the taxes considered here impose the consumption tax on the service
value of housing structures. The failure of the existing income tax to tax
the service value of consumer durables, including housing, has been the
subject of extensive commentary. The case for federal taxation of hous-
ing services is uneasy, however, because state and local property taxes
already put the equivalent of a tax on housing services. The addition of a
federal tax might push the balance too far in the direction of a bias
against housing. A further complication is that some of the state and
local taxes finance personal consumption and should not be considered
taxes at all.
None of the consumption taxes actually measures and taxes the value
of the services of houses. Instead, they impose an equivalent tax at the
time that houses are built. Contractors would pay the VATs, the sales
tax, or the HallRabushka tax, and there would be no provision for
families to deduct the cost of a new house. Structures would be on an
equal footing whether they were owned or rented. In the rental situa-
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lion, the landlord would receive an immediate write-off for the new
structure and would then pay tax on the rental receipts. The two should
be equal in present value Eliminating both sides, as in the case of owner
occupancy, leaves the substance of the tax unaffected.
Note that the treatment of houses as investment goods calls for remov-
ing the taxation of new house production, whereas the taxation of the
flow of services calls for replacing exactly the same tax. The combination
of treating houses as investments and of bringing their service flows into
the tax base is an exact wash. Under all the consumption taxes consid-
ered here, housing does not participate in the investment boom that
would accompany tax reform because of the extension of taxation to
housing services.
7.3 Elimination of the Mortgage Deduction
As a general matter, the deductibility of interest under an income tax is
purely an administrative question and has no economic substance. If all
taxpayers were subject to interest taxation in the first place, the removal
of all interest deductions and the companion removal of all interest
taxation would simply result in interest rates that were lower by the
amount of the income tax. In this world, removing the mortgage deduc-
lion would have almost no effect, even in the short run, on housing.
The U.S. income tax is far from the simple entity just described. Many
interest recipients are not taxed, and the personal tax permits deduction
only of interest on borrowing against securities and houses. To some
extent, the demand for houses is increased and the demand for cars is
decreased because houses permit deductible borrowing and cars do not.
Interestingly, although the personal tax treatment of interest on borrow-
ing against securities is identical to that for houses, nobody has character-
ized the deduction of interest on securities as a "subsidy" to securities.
Under the modern U.S. income tax, only higher income taxpayers take
itemized deductions. The impact of the elimination of the benefit associ-
ated with deductibility of interest on mortgages would necessarily be
limited to the upper end of the housing market.
I conclude that removal of the tax deduction for mortgage interest
would be a small negative influence in the short run for the price of
housing structures and in the short and long run for land prices.
7.4 Lower Interest Rates
The switch to consumption taxation will cause lower interest rates in the
longer run. Recall that land is not brought under consumption taxation
under any of the proposals. The price of land would rise immediately as
a result of the anticipation of lower future interest rates.Effects of Tax Reform on Prices and Asset Values85
7.5 Conclusions on Housing
On net, I believe that the consumption tax reforms considered in the
present paper would have a modest negative effect on housing prices
and demand. If the reforms did not extend taxation to housing services,
there would be a substantial stimulus to housing demand. The effect on
housing prices would depend on how the consumption taxes avoided
the taxation of services.
Under a sales tax, an easy way to avoid taxing housing services would
be to exempt new houses from the tax. Houses would then fail to partici-
pate in the jump in prices that would affect consumption goods. Under
all the other taxes, the purchaser would need to be given a deduction or
rebate at the time of purchase. For the standard VATs and Hall-
Rabushka, it is hard to see how this could be done in practice. For the
VATs, some type of personal tax return just for this purpose would have
to be created. For HallRabushka, the loss carryforward mechanism
currently present in the business tax return would have to appear on the
personal return. For a personal consumption tax based on the cash-flow
principle, the deduction would be straightforward, but only because that
tax is so complicated to begin with.
The ease of accommodating a more generous treatment of housing
may tilt the balance of tax reform toward a national sales tax. Alterna-
tively, under HallRabushka or any consumption tax system that has a
personal return, it would be attractive to create a deduction related to
home ownership. For example, homeowners could deduct double their
state and local property taxes. The effect would be to lower the rate of
federal taxation of housing services to reflect the high existing rates
under state and local property taxes.
The inclusion of a deduction based on property taxes could more than
offset the adverse effects of tax reform on housing.
8. HUMAN CAPITAL
Most human capital formation is already taxed on the consumption basis
and would remain so under tax reform. When a student foregoes earn-
ings in order to go to school, or a worker earns a lower cash wage
because of the value of training on the job, the investment is receiving
immediate write-off under either tax system. The cash expenses in-
curred by an employer who provides training on the job are generally
given immediate write-off as well.
The cash expenses of education or training incurred by individuals are
not given consumption-tax treatment today. Under the sales tax, firms86Hall
and schools could be exempted. Under HallRabushka and the personal
consumption tax, individuals could be given deductions for human capi-
tal expenses. Under the VATs, it is unclear how to provide individuals
with deductions or rebates. A partial answer is to exempt firms and
schools from the VAT, but this does not cover the intermediate products
purchased by those organizations.
Much of the cash expense of human capital formation is incurred by
governments, particularly state and local ones. Improvements in the effi-
ciency of this process could most likely be achieved by limiting the govern-
ment's roles to financing education rather than trying to produce it.
Within a system of government financed and privately produced educa-
tion, the issue of providing consumption-tax treatment under the federal
tax system to education could be resolved along with the more general
issue of the role of the federal government in financing education.
9. DOUBLE TAXATION OF EXISTING SAVINGS
A common criticism of consumption tax reform is that savings accumu-
lated from after-tax income under an income tax will be taxed again as it
is consumed. The design of a consumption tax may need to include
transition provisions to deal with this issue. A companion issue is the
treatment of tax-deferred saving in retirement plans.
Section 3 explained that different consumption taxes impose different
patterns of double taxation and windfalls. Table 3 summarizes the effects
for debt and equity for savings currently held in after-tax and tax-
deferred form.
The VATs and the sale tax raise the price level and thereby deny the
holders of debt the purchasing power they expected. There is no effect
on the purchasing power of debt and no tax consequence from using
debt to finance consumption under HallRabushka. Under the personal
consumption tax, a tax is imposed on consumption financed from debt.
The second line of Table 3, showing double taxation of equity held in
after-tax form under the income tax, reflects the conclusion in the next-
to-last line in Table 1 that the value of investment goods to their owners
(the shareholders) is depressed by the amount of the tax by all consump-
tion taxes.
For tax-deferred debt, in the case of the VATs and the sales tax, the
removal of income taxes at the time of distribution is offset by the in-
crease in the price level, and there is no net effect. For HallRabushka,
there is a windfall from the elimination of the expected income tax and
no offsetting event. For the personal consumption tax, the new tax takes




























































































































































































































































































































windfall. For tax-deferred equity, the decline in the purchasing power of
equity replaces the expected income tax for all taxes, and there is no
double tax or windfall.
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